A father is not a secondary parent.

Equal responsibility is already in the law

Article 1197 of Georgia’s Civil Code gives parents equal rights and duties towards their children. Article 1198 places responsibilities for care and development on parents. The law does not describe the father as an optional addition to a child’s life. [1]

For our work, equality means examining actual care, safety, the child’s views and the reasons for any restriction. It does not mean an automatic equal-time arrangement or a presumption of contact regardless of danger. A parent who reports abuse must be heard; a parent who disputes it must be able to put forward relevant evidence. The child needs an independent voice throughout.

The question raised by the case

The reviewed claim describes substantial earlier care by the father, initially positive Agency assessments and a later position that the claimant says was not properly explained. It also alleges that concerns about education and health went unanswered. We treat these as matters for examination against the records, not proof of a national pattern from one family. [2]

The practical questions are demanding enough. Did the decision examine each parent’s conduct using the same criteria? Was a warning discounted because of who raised it? Did officials record safe caregiving, rather than only accusations? Were the child’s words obtained independently? Did an overturned measure lead to a fresh assessment, or merely leave the arrangement in place?

European rights protect fathers too

Article 8 ECHR protects private and family life; Article 14 prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of Convention rights. In Zaunegger v. Germany, the European Court found unjustified discrimination in the custody rules affecting an unmarried father. The case concerned access to an individual judicial assessment, not an automatic award of custody. [3] [4]

We use those standards to demand examination of sex-based assumptions in Georgia. The relevant test is the decision and its reasons: a general statement about mothers or fathers cannot substitute for assessment of the child’s situation.

Who trains the decision-makers?

Public authorities and the organisations that train them should disclose the guidance they use. European funding or a rights-based mission is not a certificate of sound practice; neither is it evidence of wrongdoing. The content of the guidance and its effect on decisions are what must be examined.

We propose an open review of the guidance institutions actually use: who wrote it, what research supports it, who approved it and whether it encourages different credibility assumptions according to a parent’s sex. Where a concrete text or practice is harmful, we will identify it and seek its correction. The same review should examine state and non-state contributors.

A useful audit would compare similar cases, record the reasons for restrictions and examine access to representation, assessments and support. Aggregate data should distinguish parents’ sex, caregiving history and documented risks without exposing children. A count of who received residence alone would not explain whether the decisions were justified.

What changes for the child?

Our aim is not to replace a preference for mothers with a preference for fathers. It is to prevent a child losing safe care because an institution applied a stereotype. That means a father’s evidence and requests for help receive a substantive response, just as a mother’s must. It also means complaints of violence are assessed on their content rather than dismissed as litigation tactics.

We seek reasoned decisions, meaningful review of interim restrictions, recognition of established safe caregiving and professional support for restoring relationships where appropriate. Where contact is unsafe, protection must be real. Where exclusion lacks a sound basis, it must not continue merely because a case has taken years.